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Few concepts In social history have caught the academic Imagina-
tion to the same extent as Eric Hobsbawm's Image of the social
bandit, "peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as
criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are
considered by their people as heroes."1 A number of efforts have
been made to reassess African crime In the light of social
banditry, most notably In Donald Crummey's collection, RandI try.
Rebellion and goclal Protest In Africa. Although Crummey admits
that "our contributors found plenty of ordinary bandits, but ..
few social ones", he Is reluctant to abandon the concept
altogether because "most popular violence Is a response to state
or ruling-class violence."1
A similar thread runs through the limited South African
historiography on African crime. Although Charles Van Onselen's
classic study of the Nlnevltes concludes that the South African
experience "produced not social, but profoundly antl-soqlal
bandits", he nevertheless pays tribute to the Nlnevlte
achievement In constructing a social and Ideological alternative
1
 E.J. Hobsbawm, Bane]Its. 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1985), p.17. The social bandit made his first appearance In
Hobsbawm's Primitive Rebels (Manchester: University Press,
1959).
"London: James Currey, 1986, pp.1,7.
to an unjust society. And, in presenting their "participant's
perspective" of MaRashea, Guy and Thabane cannot but be impressed
by their protagonist's success in triumphing "over a world which
by its nature means to bring him down."1
Although Hobsbawm himself was careful to distinguish between
"social" and "common" banditry, it nevertheless remains true that
"social banditry" has dominated the academic agenda. "Common
banditry" and "rural criminality" are, after all, not so much
analytical categories as intellectual trashcans into which all
bandits other than social bandits can be dumped. Little progress
has been made thus far in analysing the nature and implications
of African crime, more particularly when crime is directed not
against the state but against fellow-Africans. And so far as
South Africa specifically is concerned, nothing whatsoever has
been done to elucidate the nature of organised crime in the black
rural areas, where the targets are not ethnic strangers but
one's own neighbours and relatives.
This study of the stock thieves of Qumbu takes its cue not from
Hobsbawm, but from his most trenchant critic. Thirty months of
1
 C. Van Onselen, New B^bvlon. New Nineveh (Johannesburg:
Ravan, 1982), Vol II, p.195. J. Guy and M. Thabane, "The Ma-
Rashea: a Participant's Perspective" in Class. Community and
Conf1 let, ed. B. Bozzol1 (Johannesburg! Ravan, 1987). 1 am
aware that much more has been published on African
criminality, particularly in the urban context, but It Is
beyond the scope of this paper, not to mention my present
capacity, to give an exhaustive bibliography.
fieldwork In western Sicily motivated Anton Blok to note that:4
Rather than actual champions of the poor and the weak,
bandits quite often terrorized those from whose very
ranks they managed to rise, and thus helped suppress
them.
Qumbu is not in Sicily, and there are pertinent differences
between Transkei and Italy which wiI I be explored In due course.
Suffice It to say that the heroes of this paper are not the
thieves but the anti-thieves, who genuinely embody the demo-
cratic will and popular norms which some academics have mistak-
enly sought in the guise of bandits. The paper is dedicated to the
memory of my friends, Slndilso Slyotula (d. Feb. 1992) and Mark
Dyasi (d. Jan. 1993), assassinated by the stock thieves of Qumbu.
From Raiding to Theft
Cattle-raiding was one of the most prominent aspects of
precolonlal Xhosa warfare. "One now hurries to pursue the
conquered enemy close at heel," wrote Landdrost Alberti in 1806,
"and mainly endeavours to seize his cattle ... A great quantity
of the captured cattle are immediately slaughtered and con-
sumed.''" Even during peacetime, it was regarded as perfectly
legitimate for bands of raiders to cross Into the territory of
* A. Blok, "The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry
Reconsidered", CSSti (1972); A. Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian
VII I age (Oxford: BlackwelI, 1974).
» L. Alberti, Account of the Xhosa (1811). Ed. and trans.
W.Fehr. (Cape Town: Balkema, 1968), p.91.
neighbouring chiefdoms and lift their cattle. This was called
ukunyangaza; and the chief's approval of the proceedings was
signified by the fact that he accepted a share of the spoil.'
During the dying years of the independent Xhosa kingdoms, the
ukunyangaza tradition threw up recognlsably social bandits,
especially among the Gcaleka Xhosa, who had borne the brunt of
the Frontier Wars and lost most of their lands and cattle in the
process. Thieves such as Beja and Sidubulekana raided the black
auxiliaries of the colonial forces and bore away cattle and guns.
Their feats were celebrated in anecdote and song, and they were
regarded as heroes by their beleaguered fellow-countrymen. Nor did
they steal for themselves alone. "Is it not Beja, the man who
enriched you all and never came back with empty hands?" mourned
King Sarhl11, when he heard the news of the hero's brave and
inevitable demise. And Sidubulekana "collected a number of
destitute women and children and supported them for a long time
in rugged and well-wooded country", before the colonial forces
gunned him down In 1878.'
For commentators such as John Henderson Soga, there is a world of
difference between such heroes and those whom he styles petty
thieves and pilferers.
•V.P. Ndamase, Ama-Mpondo: Ibali neNtlalo (Lovedale: n.d.),
p.56.
7W.T. Brownlee, "Sidubulekana the Gun Thief" and "Beja's Last
Raid" in Reminiscences of a Transkelan (Pletermaritzburg:
Shuter and Shooter, 1975); J.H. Soga, The Ama-Xosa: Life and
Customs (Lovedale: n.d.), pp.358-67.
The courage, cunning and resource requisite for the
prosecution of so dangerous a trade, wherein the raider
stakes his life against the cattle, arouses Interest
and a feeling akin to sympathy for the robber ... The
petty thief and pilferer, on the other hand Is
anathema.
The element of panache carried over Into the high colonial
period, and helped to mask the transition from social bandit to
something worse. This is evident from the fictionalised
autobiography of Ntsukumbinl, a Transkelan cattle thief, as
rendered by his Indulgent magistrate, Frank Brownlee.*
There was something sporting in the way these people
carried out their operations. The poor, as a rule, were
not robbed; to I I was taken from the fat herds of the
rich. I have reason to know that thefts were sometimes
carried out merely for the purpose of demonstrating
ski I I in stealing.
Ntsukumbinl felt no moral qualms about his activities, and he
took pride in outwitting and outfighting the slow and stupid
people from whom he stole. But, heroics aside, Ntsukumbini cannot
really be termed a social bandit. His thefts were not approved by
the Great Place but were carried out purely for the benefit of
his Immediate household. They constituted a family secret, and
were not explicitly discussed even within the family. Ntsukum-
blnl's father initiated him into the fellowship of thieves by
instructing him to steal a sheep from his maternal uncle, a
remarkable breach of kinship morality especially inasmuch as
"there was harmony and friendship between my father and my little
father (uncle)". Ntsukumbini's mother was burned out as a witch.
Though Ntsukumbini professed to be surprised by this ("my mother
'Ntsukumbini: Cattle Thief (London: Jonathan Cape, 1929), p.12.
was a person full of kindness and kindly acts"), It does not say
much for the esteem In which the Ntsukumbini household was held
In Its Immediate neighbourhood.
Ntsukumbini: Cattle Thief also provides us with several Insights
into the practices and techniques of thieving, many of which have
persisted Into the present day. Space precludes all the details,
but one must point to the deference shown even then by thieves
towards duly constituted authority In the persons of magistrates
and chiefs. "It is the custom of chiefs," Ntsukumbini's father
advised, "to be kindly disposed towards those common folk who
know how they should comport themselves In the presence of their
superiors." And, even during the high colonial period, thieves
were well able to employ white lawyers In order to evade
punishment. Far from being hostile to the colonial legal system,
thieves were well able to exploit its limitations to their own
advantage. This also Is a continuing feature of the history of
Qumbu district, to which we now turn.
The Qumbu Context
Qumbu town lies about 60 kilometres east of Umtata. The district
is bordered west and east by the Tsitsa and Tina rivers, to the
south by Mpondoland and to the north by the mixed Sotho/Hlubl
district of Mount Fletcher. The northwest corner Just touches the
"white" farming district of Maclear. These are the slopes of the
Cape Drakensberg, and the north of the district Is fairly rugged.
Though it can hardly be termed impenetrable, north Qumbu's
combination of secluded valleys and inadequate roads make It
Ideal for the harbouring of cattle. Lookouts can be posted on
strategic hi I I tops to give ample warning of approaching trouble.
The proximity of Maclear provides a convenient channel of the
disposal of stolen stock. Such conditions are not unique to
Qumbu, and the other districts on the southern fringes of the
Orakensberg - Engcobo, Tsolo and Mount Fletcher - are likewise
afflicted with the problan of chronic stock theft.
Economically, there is little to distinguish Qumbu from the other
27 districts of Transkel. It is neither especially rich, nor
extremely poor. The population of the district in 1985 was
117,291, of whom only 20,802 (37,4% of the economically active
population) were In formal employment.* 92,2% of these were
migrant labourers mostly on the Witwatersrand, but access to
employment has become Increasingly difficult since the Native
Recruiting Corporation office In Qumbu closed down about 1987.
The district is overwhelmingly rural, with less than one percent
of the total population Ilving in Qumbu town, yet only 38 males
describe themselves as employed full-time In agriculture. In
other words, the people of Qumbu are not Independent peasants but
a displaced proletariat, marginalised and lacking even the
opportunity to engage In wage labour.
•Statistics are taken from the Transkel Population Census 1985.
V/ol VI, undertaken by the Institute of Management and
Development Studies (University of Transkel), for the
Department of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.
Qumbu has a long history of anti-colonial struggle.10 The best-
known incident in Qumbu history occurred in 1880, when Chief
Mhlontlo of the Mpondomlse engineered the murder of his
magistrate, Hamilton Hope The colonial authorities suppressed the
Mpondomlse chieftainship and confiscated large tracts of Mpondo-
mlse territory. They imported Hlubi, Bnele and other Mfengu but,
far from proving co-operative, these Christianised elements soon
took the lead in setting up independent schools and churches. In
the 1920's, Qumbu became a stronghold of Garveyite and "American"
movements. Localities such as Lower Culunca were "noted for
continued opposition to the headman, whoever he may be". Overly
co-operative headmen were liable to find their sheep stabbed or
their cattle poked up the anus with a spear.11 Middle Tyhira
locality was the home of Elliot Tonjenl, formerly a renowned
Communist militant in the Western Cape.'*
The dominant traditional leader In Qumbu between 1931 and 1949
was the Regent Isaac Matlwane. Isaac's concept of political
strategy was to "wash away the blood of Hope" by utter
'"For the early history of Qumbu see V. Beinart, "Conflict In
Qumbu" in V. Beinart and C. Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural
South Africa (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), Ch.3.
11
 Cape Archives. 1/QBU 70 S. Matiwane - RM Qumbu, 6 March 1939.
CMT 3/1471 File 42B RM Qumbu - Chief Magistrate Transkei, 6
June 1939.
17
 On Elliot Tonjenl, see, for example, E. Roux, Time Longer
than Rope (2nd ed, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1964), pp.232-243.
subservience to the authorities." He loyally signed up for the
South African Army during World War II, and when the
rehabilitation scheme was introduced to Qumbu, he did not shirk
his duty.14 But when Sigidl Matiwane, Isaac's ward, came of age in
1949, he sought to make his presence felt by overturning the
"progressive" measures of his guardian.
"What have I been Installed as chief for?" asked Sigidl. "Are we
compelled to accept rehabilitation scheme tricks drawn before [by
Isaac] in spite of our opposition to the scheme?"" Headmen who
had supported rehabilitation were mocked and Jeered at Mpondomise
gatherings. Sigidi demanded the right to allocate land and
nominate headmen. "1 am against rehabilitation," he said,
"because 1 do not see the Pondomise land which I was told I was
to rule."
Sigidi's chieftainship came to an end very abruptly In April 1954.
He was observed driving, very drunkenly and without a license,
along the road from Sulenkama to Qumbu. When the police
approached the vehicle, Sigidl and his companions resisted, and
one companion was beaten up to the extent that he actually died.
• Transkei Archives. Box 163, File 3/19/2/3, has got full
details of the long struggle to restore the Mpondomise
chieftainship.
' On rehabilitation, see especially F.T. Hendrlcks, The PI 1lars
of Apartheid: Land Tenure. Rural Planning and the Chleftancv
(Uppsala: Acta Universitatls Upsaliensls, No.32, 199O).
" Transkei Archives. Box 163, File 3/19/2/3 for the story of
Sigidi Matiwane.
800 Mpondomlse gathered at Middle Tyhira, and Sigldl promised to
lead them Into Qumbu town the very next day. But when the police
brought In reinforcements, Including six Sten guns, from al1 over
Transkel, Slgidi was too frightened to do anything more than
meekly pay his fine. The authorities dismissed Sigidi, overlooked
his younger brother, and reappointed the faithful Isaac as Regent
under the Bantu Authorities Act.
The Makhuluspan
The Mpondomlse chieftainship had fallen, never to rise again. The
popular movement in Qumbu, which had briefly rallied around him,
quickly recognised that Sigldl was a drunkard and Welsh, his
younger brother, was even worse. At the same time, they were not
willing to accept the reimposltlon of colonial authority in the
form of good-boy Isaac Mat1 wane. They cut loose from the
Mpondomlse royal family, and with it, they also abandoned the
backward-look ing and narrowly tribalistlc (that is, antl-Mfenqu)
outlook which Mpondomise traditionalism would necessarily have
entailed. The will to resist was there; It only required a vehicle
through which to express itself.
The first sign that something entirely new was about to happen
came In the form of a series of anonymous letters to the Chief
Magistrate of Transkei and the Secretary of Native Affairs. These
letters focussed on rehabilitation, and condemned the Qumbu Magi-
10
strate and the collaboratlng chiefs. The tone was mock respect-
ful, and more than a little threatening:1*
The magistrates have forced rehabilitation. We did
not accept it. We don't want to go behind you
(Chief Magistrate], and do things you don't know.
We tell you this thing, and we will not tell you
again. Next time you will just hear the sound.
Because we don't want the Magistrate coming around
us and putting up the fence. We are quite
satisfied with whatever might happen next.
This letter was written on 17 September 1956. Three months later,
the people of Qumbu began to burn out suspected stock thieves.
There is no conclusive proof that the antl-rehabl11tatlon
activists, who had formerly supported Slgldl Matiwane, were also
the force behind the anti-theft movements which convulsed Qumbu
for the next three years. But the probability Is overwhelming.
The English word "COMPANY" is almost certainly a translation of
the Xhosa word "lbandla", meaning the followers of a chief. In
the absence of a viable chieftainship, it acquires the sense of
"community". The word "ibandla" was also generally used by the
people who constituted the anti-theft courts to describe
themse1ves."
'• Transkei Archives. Box 1(33. File 3/19/2/3 Company - Secretary
of Native Affairs, 23 April 1955; Company - Chief Magistrate
Transkei, 17 Sept. 1956.
•'Cape Archives CMT 3/1481, File 42/19/ Statement of C.F.
Scheepers, Officer Commanding Sulenkama Police Station, 2 May
1957.
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As soon as the anti-theft movement commenced, it became the sole focus
of politics in Qumbu district, and little more was heard
thereafter concerning either Sigidl Matiwane or rehabilitation.
Although the Makhuluspan ("big team")1" did not mount a direct
challenge to the authorities, it implicitly defied the colonial
monopoly of law and order, and substituted a framework of popular
institutions and popular justice for the illegitimate insti-
tutions and ineffective justice of the official courts.
Oral tradition remembers nothing of a connection between the
anti-theft movement and broader political issues. It is possible
that the Makhuluspan might have originated outside Qumbu, in
the neighbouring Mount Fletcher district where the Tshisa-tshisa
("burn-burn") anti-theft movement commenced about the same
time.'* Alternatively, the Makhuluspan might have been a reaction
to an undoubted increase in stock theft. Police statistics
clearly Indicate a sudden upsurge In stock theft between 1950
and 1956. The number of cattle reported stolen at Sulenkama
police station increased from 7 in 1950 (2 cases) to no fewer
than 188 in 1956 (82 cases), and the number of stolen sheep and
goats Increased from 19 (3 cases) in 1950 to 773 (68 cases) in
'• I use this term throughout for the sake of convenience, but it
is worth noting that it first appears in 1958, that is more
than a year after the first manifestation of the movement.
'• Cape Archives CMT 1480 H.J. Du Plooy - Bantu Affairs
Department, 3 July 1958. Tshlsa-tshlsa is very poorly
documented. Mount Fletcher is an enormously complex district
which warrants further research.
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1956. Fewer than half of these cases were brought to trial, and
only half of these secured a conviction.10 According the Chief
Magistrate of Transkei,"
The thieves either cannot be convicted or escape
conviction when prosecuted! Qumbu criminal rol1 Is
so heavy that cases are often not concluded until
months after the first arraignment. The accused
gets ball, and by the time the trial takes place,
witnesses have disappeared and good evidence has
deteriorated.
Some of the alleged thieves were extremely wealthy by Transkel
standards. Joseph Mphomane of Ngqayi Locality owned 75 head of
cattle, 375 wool led sheep and 67 goats. He was twice prosecuted
for stock theft, but was never convicted. Stock thieves had
become so bold that they made open demands at beer-drinks and
rural ceremonies. Ironically referring to themselves as the
"abatshana" or "nephews" ("you know that when your nephew comes to
visit you, you have to give him something.") Many homestead-heads
paid regular protection money to known stock thieves to avoid
'•Cape Archives GSC 1/2/1/797 Case 337 of 1957. Crown versus
Klaas Memanl and others. Statement of Sergeant C.F. Scheepers.
I would like to thank Clifton Crais for generosity well beyond
the call of duty in supplying me with this and the following
SSC references.
" CMT 3/1481 File 42/19 Chief Magistrate Transkel - Secretary
of Native Affairs, 14 March 1957. Mr Theo Berrange, the Qumbu
attorney who defended first the thieves and then the anti-
thieves, shares the popular opinion that the Makhuluspan began
because too many known stock thieves were being acquitted In
the Magistrate's court. Interviewed Cape Town, January 1993.
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being robbed."
The problem was not, therefore, to identify the thieves but to
get rid of them. Oral tradition records that the first thief to
be killed was TUtselana of Nkwenkwezi locality." The earliest
documented case of burning was against Headman Heathcote Sinxeke
of Lower Tyhlra, an admitted thief who had already been called
before the Magistrate to explain the prevalence of theft in his
locality.'* The attacks spread from locality to locality, and
between January and March 1957 more than 400 huts were burned and
at least seven people were killed.
Each of the affected localities had its own Makhuluspan
committee, consisting of representatives of the various sub-
localities, and usually including a Judge and a Secretary or
Treasurer. The latter official was responsible for recording
fines, and collecting contributions from the people to pay for
the legal costs of defending Makhuluspan activists in the
colonial courts. Some committees even parallelled official
institutions to the extent of creating positions such as
Prosecutor, Attorney, Detective and Constable. There can be no
" N. Fadane, "Unrest in Tsolo In 1957-61", B.A. (Honours
project, University of Transkei, 1992); W.D. Hammond-Tooke,
Command or Consensus (Cape Town: David Philip, 1975), p.106;
CMT 3/1481 File 42/19 CMT-SNA, 8 May 1957.
" Fadane, "Unrest in Tsolo".
74
 Cape Archives 1/QBU 70 file 1/9/1 Joylzana Mamoza-SAP, 21
Jan.1957; SAP Qumbu - RM Qumbu, 23 Jan.1957; CMT 3/1481 File
42/19 CMT-SNA, 14 March 1957.
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doubt of the popular legitimacy of such, committees, as even the
police admitted that they were made up of the most respected
community members, indeed the very individuals who were most
helpful to the police in normal times-*"
Hut-burnings were ordered by the committee after preliminary
meetings which Identified and discussed potential targets. Huge
posses of 1OO-3OO men armed with spears, swords and the
occasional gun swept down on the homesteads of the alleged
thieves, burned their huts and took their cattle. In a few cases,
the suspected thieves were deliberately sought out and killed,
but, more frequently, they were warned In advance and enabled to
escape. Women and children were not attacked, and they were
sometimes given an opportunity to remove their household goods
before the thatch was set alight. The spoil was divided up among
the sub-localities, and was usually slaughtered to prevent It
ever being restored to the thieves.'*
After the initial wave of hut-burning, the authority of the
1bandla expressed Itself more and more In the form of something
resembling people's courts. Mass meetings were held on secluded
hills, which everybody was forced to attend lest they be labelled
as thieves. Suspected thieves were Interrogated, and usually
" Cape Archives 1/QBU 70 SAP Qumbu - O/C SAP Transkei, 22
March 19G1; GSC 1/2/1/797 Case 337 Crown vs K. Memani, Judge's
remarks.
»• CMT 3/1481 File 42/19 RM Qumbu - CMT, 2 May 1957; GSC
1/2/1/797. Case 337 Crown vs K. Memani.
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beaten on the buttocks until they confessed and agreed to
compensate their victims and pay a fine to the court. Once they
had confessed and paid, they were regarded as "cleansed" and
returned to the "company of honest men". The white magistrates
and the police feared that the Makhuluspan was misusing the anti-
theft campaign "to pay off old grudges", and several of the
suspected thieves later claimed that they had only confessed to
avoid being beaten.'7 Available evidence suggests, however, that
the Qumbu Makhuluspan rarely directed itself against Innocent
individuals though more serious abuses did occur in the
neighbouring district of Tsolo.'*
Chiefs and headmen did not participate in the burnings or the
people's courts, though there are Indications in some instances
that they were consulted and approved the proceedings. Chief
Sofonia Moshesh of Ngqayi, for example, allowed a posse of
Gqukunqa men to enter his locality and attack one of his
subjects, a noted stock thief. And Wlndus Ludidl, the headman of
Qotlra location, did not protect his subject, Willie Siyotula,
although Willie was a fellow-Hlubi who stole only Mpondomise
cattle.2* The anti-theft campaign, indeed, did much to unite
" CMT 3/1481 File 42/19 CMT-SNA 14 March 1957.
** The Tsolo cases are fully documented in the Cape Archives,
especially CMT 3/1482 File 42/22, and reveal aspects which
neither Fadane nor Hammond-Tooke op clt suspect.
»• GSC 1/2/1/797 Case 336 R. vs. Ntshebe Macamba; SSC 1/2/1/799
Case 354 R. vs. Captain Siyotula.
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Qumbu district across ethnic lines. The Magistrate of Qumbu noted
that the Mpondomlse and the Mfengu "have not formed separate
factions, and kraals of both tribes have been burned."10
Unfortunately, this situation was not repeated In Tsolo, where
the senior Mpondomlse chief was heavily Involved and an ethnic
element was certainly present.
The colonial authorities could not tolerate the people taking the
law Into their own hands, and the police cracked down. From
Septeirtoer 1957, there was a wave of court cases In which anti-
theft activists and committee-men were sentenced for arson,
assault, extortion and murder. The movement disappeared
temporarily, but revived in July 1958 In a slightly different
form. It was active In fewer localities, with much less overt
violence but much more highly organised. Nine localities met In
July 1959 and attempted to secure recognition from the state.
They addressed a typed letter to the Magistrate of Qumbu, signing
themselves openly as representatives of their localities, and
stating Inter alia that:11
The African people have devised a method of
dealing with such people [thieves) and would
request the government to play blind, and let our
organisation called Makhulu-span grapple with all
forms of theft in her own way... We are confident
that If the government will give us a period of,
say, five years, we shal1 destroy theft. Would the
10
 Cape Archives CMT 3/1481 File 42/19 RM Qumbu - CMT, 31
Jan.1957; CMT - SNA, 14 March 1957.
11
 Cape Archives 1/QBU Illegible (Sec. of Makhuluspan) and 18
others - RM Qumbu, 17 July 1959.
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government please note that our organisation Is
not one of murderers but of peacemakers.
Government's response to this overture Is not recorded, but as
rural Transkei burst Into rebellion in 1960 in the wake of the
Mpondo1 and revo11, the MakhuIuspan too began to turn i ts
attention to the collaborating chiefs, Sandy Majeke and Isaac
Matlwane. Isaac complained that he was finding it difficult to
distinguish between "the so-called Makhuluspan" and "the
subsequent cruel all-out rebellious-minded, treason-minded Bantu
gangs whose secret weapon has been discovered to be 'Away with
the Government-appointed Chiefs and Away with all Progressive
Laws." Secret meetings plotting to kill the two chiefs were
undoubtedly held, and they were provided with special constables
entitled Home Guards for their protection."
The authorities hit back, and the Makhuluspan strongholds were
"combed out" by special police acting under the provisions of the
notorious Proclamation R4OO. At least 48 known Makhuluspan
leaders were detained between February and June 1961, and some
were deported. Attempts were made to revive Makhuluspan In 1962,
but the reaction had already set In and the movement petered out."
" Cape Archives 1/QBU 7O I. Matiwane-Bantu Affairs Commissioner
[BAC] Qumbu, 3 March 1960 (sic. might be 1961); CMT 3/1471 BAC
Qumbu-CMT, 4 March 1961.
" Cape Archives CMT 3/147O BAC Qumbu-CBAC Umtata, 18 May 1962,
5 Dec. 1962.
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The Thieves and the Communists
The dissolution of the Makhuluspan did not bring about the end of
stock theft in Qumbu district. As has already been pointed out,
theft is endemic In mountainous border districts where the
majority of people are very poor. Anti-theft outbreaks flared up
sporadically, for example in Mvumelwane village In 1971." But the
violence which erupted in Qumbu In 1990, and which still
continues up to the present day, absolutely dwarfs the disturb-
ances of the Makhuluspan era and can by no means be explained
away as the simple culmination of long—standing tensions. More
men died on 28 September 1992 than in the whole of the
Makhuluspan period, and the death toll in the Qumbu violence
probably already exceeds fifty persons. The focus is much less on
the capture and recapture of stolen stock than on the physical
elimination of the opposition. The present explosion is directly
and indirectly linked to the situation in South Africa as a
whole, and to the attempts of the old order - doomed perhaps, but
still full of fight - to preserve Its position in the face of
forces working for radical change. The events of 1990-1993 also
remind us, pace Hobsbawm, that unsocial bandits are, in fact, a
conservative force, partnering the reactionary state rather than
seeking to overthrow It.
14
 This was led by Gwele, the village headman. Information from
M.K. Kondlo, March 1994.
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During the Bantustan governments of Kaiser and George Matanzima
(1963-1987), which immediately followed the period of the
Makhuluspan, the thieves of Qumbu settled down into a cosy
relationship with the state. Thieving was unchallenged, but it
was also limited in scope.19
Before this investigation of thieves happened,
people looked on them with respect. They regarded
them as Mhlekazl. They took them into their
houses - out of fear. The attitude was don't
Interfere with them, try and be friendly with
them, then they won't touch you. Be on the safe
side.
People were quite willing to marry their daughters to known
thieves. Thieves were rich, and one's family stood to benefit by
the marriage. Even if the thieves did steal your property, all
was not lost. Thieves were always quarrelling with each other,
and they often told stockowners where their cattle were hidden.
Alternatively, one could engage a thief to bring back one's
cattle for as little as a bottle of brandy.
The thieves patronised the more politically influential chiefs
and headmen, and the Transkei police, freed from the control of
their white officers, were quite willing to be accomodated by
them. Although it might be going a little too far to accuse the
Matanzima brothers of benefitting personally. It could be noted
that K. Magidlgidl, a close business associate of George Matan-
19
 Interview with Comrades T.T. Tonjeni (SACP), Matyobeni and
Mfamela (Youth), Qumbu town, 7 Sept.1992. "Mhlekazl" is a term
of respect, usually reserved for chiefs and high government
officials.
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zlma, lived right in the heart of the mountainous area. But the
Matanzimas prized social stability above all else. They might
have turned a blind eye to the thieving, but they did not allow
it to get seriously out of hand. "Matanzima's police were better
than these," Quinbu people say." "Before, If you handed stock
thieves to the police, they Jailed them. Now they let them go
after one or two days."
The modus vlvendl between the stock thieves and the people of
Qumbu was shattered towards the end of 1989, when General Bantu
Holomisa first began to reveal his political sympathies, and
allowed democratic organisations to operate more freely. Up to
that point. Mass Democratic Movement structures had not existed
in Transkei, but now they made up for lost time. Qumbu youth were
In the forefront, and the first Transkei congress of youth
organisations was held in Mvumelwane, a large peri-urban
settlement just outside Qumbu town. The youth soon turned up the
heat on the more unreconstructed headmen of the district. And
they told the people that times were changing, and that they no
longer needed to tolerate stock thieves.
Thieves were operating all over Qumbu district, but they had two
strongholds in particular. One was at Mzuzanto, near the National
Road to Mount Frere. The other was at Gqukunqa locality In the
mountainous region between Sulenkama village and the white town
of Maclear. About 1988, Walter Zamuxolo ("Nomarayisl") Matiwane
'* Interview with men of Shawbury, 13 Oct.1992.
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had taken over as headman of Gqukunqa. He was not. thought of as a
stock thief before his elevation, but once In the seat he began
to publlcally demonstrate his affinity with the thieves. Qumbu
migrants had long-standing links with ISCOR and the hostels of
the Vaal Triangle, and It seems from trial records that the
thieves made contact In the Transvaal with certain white vendors
who were supplying these hostels with meat.1' It Is also strongly
rumoured that the thieves were encouraged and trained by Afri-
kaner Veerstandsbeweging (AWB) militants resident in Maclear.
In any event, the thieves acquired not only the means to export
stolen cattle out of Qumbu district, but also the contacts and
the money to buy automatic weapons and hire professional hit men.
Not for nothing was the Great Place of Nomarayisi known as
"inkundla yeemphati sham" (the court of those who carry guns).fj_
When cattle go missing from the grazing lands, it is not
automatically assumed that they have been stolen. In November
1990, eleven men of Caba went out searching. They had heard that
their cattle were in Squkunqa, but they could not find them. As
they were returning, they were accosted by a group of twenty men
headed by the notorious thief Mkhandlela Sgljlmi. The thieves
ordered the Caba men to throw down their rustic weapons, but,
" State versus W.A. Coetzee and others, Qumbu Magistrate's
Court, 3 July 1991. Transcript in the possession of the
author.
*• Interview with Fani Ncedanl, Mzaxiwa Fodo and other men of
Caba, Umtata, 17 Sept.1992.
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before they could do so, the thieves opened fire and killed
Flklle Mankayl and Masldebelele Fente. These were the first
victims of the new wave of Qumbu violence.10
After the shooting, Nomarayisl complained that the Caba men had
entered his locality without permission. But when the Caba men
approached Chief Sikhumbuzo Matiwane, the head of the Northern
Mpondomise Tribal Authority (which Includes both Caba and
Gqukunqa), the Chief refused to grant a permit. And when the Caba
men obtained a letter from the Qumbu District Commissioner,
Sikhumbuzo simply tore the letter up. The District Commissioner
referred the Caba men to Police Headquarters in Umtata, and
Police Headquarters referred them back to the District
Commissioner. And so it went.
Altogether, there were five sub-localities in the south of
Gqukunqa who refused to participate In stock theft. Nomarayisi
called them to a meeting In February 1991, and proposed that
Gqukunqa people should not fight with each other but that they
should raid the cattle of other localities. If the people of
Mrolweni and Luxenl sub-localities refused, they would be
attacked and driven into Caba. The thieves were present In force,
heavily armed. "What sort of Great Place Is this?" Nolente
Sontshalabe bravely asked. "We don't want to be part of a Great
"• Umtata Advice Office. Statement of Mzaxiwa Fodo, headman of
KwaNkancolo sub-1oca11ty, Caba, 17 Sept. 1992.
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Place that steals."*0 From that point onwards, the leaders of the
Gqukunqa anti-thieves started to sleep in the bush.
About this time, Mr Mathubeni Macamba, a migrant worker in Cape
Town returned to his rural home in Luxeni sub-1 oca 1ity. Mathubeni
had joined the ANC in Cape Town, and thought that forming an ANC
branch might improve the situation. He went to Qumbu town, and
brought back forms and cards. Everybody in Caba Joined the ANC,
but Nomarayisi and the thieves did not. On 19 June 1991, the
thieves attacked on the pretext that a certain boy had been
killed by the anti-thieves. Mathubeni came out of his house to
see what was happening, and was shot dead by Lunglsanl Macamba,
his own nephew, who had been forced out of Luxeni due to his
thieving propensities.
Similar incidents occurred along Gqukunqa's northern border with
Ngqayi locality, where the anti-thieves mobilised under the
leadership of Char I ton Ntull, a veteran of the MK underground,
and Mark Oyasi, a local shopkeeper. On 3rd January 1992, the
Gqukunqa thieves arrived at Ramatiya sub-locality in broad
daylight and drove away the cattle. The men of Ngqayi counter-
attacked right Into Gqukunqa, and recovered their cattle with
some extras to boot. The following day, Mkhandlela himself
appeared in Ngqayi and demanded the return of his cattle. This
was agreed, but Mkhandlela fled when they tried to search him
4 0
 Umtata Advice Office. Affidavit of Malayisha Joseph Macamba,
21 Oct.l992( Interview with Fani Ncedani and Mzaxiwa Fodo,
Umtata 17 Sept.1992.
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for firearms, he fled. In the course of the pursuit, the Ngqayl
men were led Into two separate ambushes and five were killed.41
The massacre of September 1992 was even worse.*1 On the 26th of the
month, the thieves appeared at the Mpaxa grazing lands and openly
drove away cattle, sheep, goats and a horse. Their owners
followed at a distance, but were turned back by the sight of the
thieves, massed and heavily armed, shooting Into the air and
shouting "Yizan' okuzithatha" [Come and get them!]. Representa-
tives from eleven antl-thlef villages met on the following day.
Again the thieves were waiting for them, and again they turned
back. On the third day, a party set out to report the matter to
the headman of Tyume sub-locality and the Sulenkama police. This
time, the thieves did not show themselves but they opened up with
AK47s and R4s, killing nine men. Not satisfied with that, they
hacked the bodies with pangas and mutilated them In the most
grisly way Imaginable. Among the dead was Nolente Sontshalabe, he
who had so bravely challenged Nomaraylsl at the thieves' Breat
Place.
41
 Umtata Advice Office. Affidavit by Charlton Ntuli, 30 April
1992.
43
 Affidavit of Malashiya Joseph Macamba, c.21 Oct. 1992; and
interview with men of Caba and Gqukunqa, 20 Oct. 1992. The
massacre was reported in the press with the usual absence of
meaningful detail. See Dally Dispatch 30 Sept., 2,6,7 Oct.
1992.
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This massacre took place on a public footpath, about 5 kilometres
from Sulenkama police station. The police set off when they heard
the shooting, but soon turned back when they realised that the
killing was still in progress. Later that week, when all was
quiet, they swooped on the villages concerned and arrested 86
suspects, thieves and anti-thieves, with a fine impartiality.
Closer to Qumbu town, the struggle between the radical youth and
the Mzuzanto thieves was more clandestine in its nature.
Assassination and counter—assassination occurred from December
1991, and it was rumoured that the thieves had a hit-list of
activists. The death of Slndiso Slyothula, a leading youth
militant and SACP member, may serve as an example. On 29th
February 1992, Siyothula attended a funeral and then made an
unscheduled stop at his grandfather's place in Qotira locality,
far from his normal place of residence. He was just sitting down
to supper when there was a knock at the door. A man in a
balaclava came in and, without saying a word, killed Siyothula
with a single shot. The murderer has never been identified."
It is not only comrades who have died. Thieves have also died,
mostly under interrogation. It is not possible to enter too
deeply into this topic, as a number of court cases are still
pending. It can be said, however, that there are certain points
of continuity with the old Makhuluspan tradition. Including the
*
3
 Umtata Advice Office. Affidavit of Zukile Isaac Siyothula, 30
April 1992.
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holding of community meetings and the collection of money from
the community to help meet the legal expenses.
It is no secret, however, that the South African Communist Party
has played the leading role In the struggle against the thieves
of Qumbu. There has been a long association between the SACP and
the District going back to the time of Elliot Tonjeni. T.T.
Tonjeni, a younger relative and ex-Robben Islander, was the first
Chairperson of the Qumbu SACP. Char 1 ton Ntuli, the MK veteran of
Ngqayl locality, Joined the Party at the time of the 1946
mlneworkers' strike.** He even managed to convert his Chief to
Communism, before the latter was "swallowed up" by Matanzlma.
After his release from Robben Island, Comrade Ntull ran an
underground railroad, smuggling youths across the Lesotho border
for military training. Most powerful of al1 was Comrade Nancy
Xathula, a schoolteacher and the mother of eight children. The
oldest, Leo Xathula, was an MK operative In Bizana in 1988. He
was shot dead by the Transkei Police after he had already
surrendered himself.*9
Ever since that time, Comrade Nancy has been at war with the
Bantustan state, its police and Its corrupt Institutions. Her
determination has not been affected by General Holomisa's
manifestation as a "good" Elantustan leader. Her sons have been
** Interview with Charlton Ntull, Umtata, 16 Aug. 1993.
"Dal Iv Dispatch. 3 March 1993
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constantly harassed and assaulted by the police, her home has
been attacked by the police and elements of the Transkei Defence
Force, and she herself faces a stack of criminal charges." But
nothing and nobody has succeeded in intimidating Mrs Xathula.
Like Harry Gwala in the Natal Midlands, Comrade Xathula cannot
fight herself. But her fiery spirit has inspired others to fight.
Other political movements have not distinguished themselves in
the present struggle. Not only in Qumbu, the ANC has preferred to
^distance itself from anti-theft movements. The main reason seems
to be that anti-theft movements tend to break the law, and the
ANC does not want to be implicated as an organisation. It prefers
to view the burning and the beating of stock thieves as "the
custom of the country" and to leave it to informal organisations.
In certain districts such as Tsolo and Mqandull, high-profile ANC
members have played a leading role in anti-theft campaigns. In
Qumbu, however, a leading ANC member Phumzile Majeke, son of the
late chief Sandy Majeke, had, in his capacity as an attorney,
defended Nomaraylsl Matiwane and a number of other stock thieves.
This undermined the image of the ANC in Qumbu and, although
most SACP members are also ANC members, it is the Party not the
ANC which is the dominant political force in the district.
The PAC, on the other hand, is regarded In Qumbu as the party of
the thieves. Few incontrovertible facts are available. At the
time of the unbanning of the organisations In February 1990, the
*• DalIv Dispatch. 11 April 1992.
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PAC had only a handful of mentiers In the district. However, due
to the strength and the radicalism of the ANC/SACP alliance, the
tendency arose for any faction which felt threatened to align
Itself with the PAC. The followers, for example, of the deposed
ex-headman of Mvumelwane, who were initially ANC members, joined
the PAC en masse when the ANC refused to support their cause. In
one of the early clashes between the comrades and the thieves, a
certain M. Ladlokova was killed on the side of the thieves. The PAC
thereafter claimed that Ladlokova had been killed not because he
was a thief, but because he was a PAC member.*' Ever since, there
has been a natural tendency on the part of the anti-thieves to
associate the PAC with thieving. Nomarayisi's tribal secretary,
Lucas Sulelo, was also the Secretary of the PAC branch.*' When
Momarayisl attempted to normalise his relationship with his
neighbours, he expressed this in terms of a desire to Join the
ANC (see be I ow).
The Thieves and the State
As the conflict between thieves and anti-thieves escalated, It
became clear that the Transkel police were part of the problem
rather than part of the solution. Not only had the local police
long been colluding with the stock thieves (see above), but the
regional leadership of the Transkel Police had been out of
*' This incident occurred about January 1992. More information
is needed. See, however, DalIv Dispatch 4 Feb.1992.
•• Interview with men of Caba, Umtata, 20 Oct.1992.
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sympathy with Holomisa's left turn, ever since the General had
given permission for the reburlal of ANC exile and martyr,
Paramount Chief Sabata Dallndyebo (September 1989) against the
strenuous objections of the Transkel Police. Holomisa responded
by lowering the age of compulsory retirement to 55 years, thereby
consigning the entire top leadership of the Transkel Police to
Instant oblivion.*' But the police remained unhappy with the new
dispensation, and their attitude to the comrades did not Improve
with the progress of time Inasmuch as youth comrades in places
like Luslkislkl became increasingly confrontational towards the
police, and even neck laced some of them.
Throughout Transkel, therefore, the police ranged themselves on
the side of the established order and. In Qumbu, that established
order happened to Include the thieves. One incident out of many
may serve to illustrate the nature of their collaboration.50
During the youth offensive against the thieves of Mzuzanto, the
comrades set a trap for the thieves. They went to Umtata and
arranged with a certain Colonel Ngxabane (one of the occasional
honest policemen) to send reliable policemen to Qumbu on 22
•• Confidential Information.
so
 Another famous incident occurred In early February 1992, when
a police unit sent out to track down the thieves, but made
common cause with the thieves and attacked the comrades
Instead. This was reported In the Dallv Dispatch. 4 Feb. 1992,
but the report is Incomprehensible without background
Information.
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December 1991.S1 They also made it known to the thieves that they
were coming to attack them on that day. On the 22nd, the comrades
arrived at the thieves' place with the reliable policemen
concealed in their midst. As the thieves were about to open fire
with their R4s and their AK47s, the police revealed themselves
and arrested all of them. They also confiscated a number of police
uniforms that the thieves used from time to time. The Umtata
police then handed the thieves over to the Qumbu police, who
released them on a free ball the very next day. Not only that,
but they returned their firearms. Among those so released was the
notorious thief, Makalanyana Ratazo. On his way home, Makalanyana
saw Gebelele Dumezweni, one of the comrades involved in the trap
of the previous day. He shot him dead at the Qumbu taxi rank In
full view of everybody. When It was reported to the Qumbu police,
they refused to do anything, suggesting that the comrades should
contact "your Colonel Ngxabane".
Colonel Ngxabane died In a car smash a few months later. Nobody
thinks it was an accident. Makalanyana, on the other hand,
continued to flaunt his apparent invulnerability. A few days
later, he seized a horse from Its owner and threatened to shoot
him. He "kidnapped" a young married woman, and took her to his
place. Both cases were reported to the police, who refused to
act. They said they "did not have a vehicle." But, on more than
11
 Umtata Advice Office. File Q 4192 Qumbu violence. Affidavit
of Kokose Mbombo, 30 April 1992; Affidavit of Makorinte Mzamo,
30 April 1992.
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one subsequent occasion, the comrades saw the police giving the
thieves lifts in the very vehicles that they denied having.
It is impossible to exaggerate the ineffectiveness of the police,
or their unwillingness to confront the deteriorating situation in
Qumbu. On 17 September 1992, I personally accompanied a
delegation of reputable, middle-aged men from Caba locality to
speak to the Minister of Police and the Deputy Commissioner In
the Botha Slgcau building, Umtata. It was clear that something
was In the air, and that Nomaraylsi Matiwane was planning
something big. The high officials were very sympathetic, asked a
lot of questions and promised to send in a special anti-riot unit
to clean up the whole area and stay in it. But they did nothing
and twelve days later, nine men of Caba and Gqukunqa perished In
the worst massacre ever to take place in Qumbu district. Once or
twice, In response to public pressure, certain policemen were
withdrawn from Qumbu, but those who replaced them were just as
bad. Small wonder that the residents of Qumbu, In an official
meeting with Minister of State A.T. Sigcu, asked for the complete
removal of all police from Qumbu district, "stating that they
were sick and tired of the way the police were working together
with the thieves."01
"ABeml bakuQumbu abafuni nokuwabona amaPolisa [the residents
of Qumbu don't want even to see the Police]", I so Iomz i
(Umtata), June 1992.
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The malaise of the Transkel police was echoed In other organs of
the state. There Is something in the law of Native Administration
that enables blatant murder to be excused as faction fighting.
After the September massacre, in which nine men were shot dead
by automatic weapons from a distance of more than 100 metres
while walking along a public road leading to a police station,
both factions were arrested and charged with "fighting" as if
they were equally culpable. The thieves were defended by
prominent lawyers, and legal delays did much to keep them out of
Jail. Nomarayisl Matiwane, for example, was convicted of stock
theft in July 1992, but at the time of writing (April 1994). he
Is still out and free, pending his appeal. Despite the peremptory
powers at their disposal, the Transkei government is still unable
to effectively dismiss Nomarayisi from his Acting Headmanshlp.
When an official from the Military Council came to Qumbu to
suspend Nomarayisl, the Magistrate of Qumbu and the District
Commissioner were so afraid that they absented themselves from
the meeting, which therefore collapsed. In Umtata, they say that
Nomarayasi has been dismissed. But that's not the way it looks
in Squkunqa.
Defining the Thieves
A fulI explanation of theft and anti-theft movements in Qumbu
would obviously require extensive social and economic profiles of
the two factions. This could only be achieved after an extended
period of fieldwork, which is simply not possible at the present
time. One is therefore rellant on the perceptions of the anti-
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thieves, which are not only biassed but limited in analytical
depth.
Communities are unanimous in asserting that people do not become
thieves out of necessity, just because they are poor.'1 Thieving
is a moral defect embedded in the personality of certain
individuals. It arises out of greed. Thieves want to be rich in
cattle, sheep, horses and motor cars. Some want to start their
own businesses. Thieving 13 not confined to any particular ethnic
group. One finds thieves equally among the Mpondomise, Hlubi and
the Bhele. In each and every locality and sub-locality, one will
find three or four homesteads of thieves. There are certain
nuclear families which specialise in thieving, but an honest man
can have several sons and one of them will turn out to be a thief
just because of the "thlefness" lubusela) that Is in him. Thieves
are not bound by generally accepted rules and moral values. "He
has no compunction in stealing from his own relatives." They are,
in the words of one Chairperson of the Transkei ANC. "the
outcasts of society".'*
From my own limited observation, I can confirm the truth of many
of these statements. It Is certainly true that the question of
thieving is not an ethnic one. Indeed the problem of stock theft
has done much to unite the people of Qumbu across the Mpondomise/
" For example. Interview with men of Shawbury, 13 Oct.1992.
04
 Comrade David Ndawonde, speaking at the funeral of Comrade
Mark Dyasl, assassinated by thieves, January 1993.
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Mfengu ethnic boundary established at the time of Hope's War. It
is also true that thieves and anti-thieves can be found within
the same family, often with tragic consequences. Willie
Siyothula, a thief, was murdered during the Makhuluspan period at
the instigation of his cousin, Ambrose Siyothula, but it seems as
if the thieving Siyothula's have now settled the score by the
murder of the anti-thief Slndlso Siyothula In 1992. Another
example is that of Mathubenl Macamba of Caba, murdered by his
nephew, Lungisani Macamba who had been forced out of the village
"on account of his bad habits."88 In all the fighting between the
thieves and anti-thieves of Gqukunqa, members of the Macamba and
Ncedanl families have been found on both sides.
At the same time, once cannot simply explain thieving In terms of
the badness of a particular person's character. One need3 to
see It In the context of Transkei's place In the political economy
of South Africa as a whole. First and foremost, It is a
marginalised region of the country, a dumping ground for
displaced proletarians who cannot make a living out of
agriculture and cannot hope for employment In the industrial
" C M T 1481. File 42/19 Letter from G.T. Matiwane (Willie
Siyothula); Umtata Advice; Office File Q/492 unsigned statement
CK.Mbombo), c.April 1992 (Slndiso Siyothula); Interview with
men of Caba and Bqukunqa, Umtata, 20 Dec.1992 (Macamba).
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sector.'" There Is no socially acceptable way forward for the
young and the ambitious, and they are therefore easily co-opted
by the prospect of quick riches. The current weakness of the
Transkei state has proved a fertile ground for co-operation
between the thieves and disaffected members of the security
apparatus. These factors affect the whole of Transkei, and indeed
stock theft is on the Increase throughout the region. But In
Qumbu, the position is aggravated by a long tradition of stock
theft, the mountainous nature of the terrain, and the connivance
of AWB-style elements operating out of Maclear.
I began this paper by complaining about the undue attention
which social history pays to the "social bandit". Emboldened by
the absence, to my knowledge, of any substantial treatments of
the "unsocial bandit" within the field of social history, I would
therefore like to venture some general comments on the basis of
the Qumbu example. My major point of comparative reference Is
Anton Blok's The Mafia of a Sicilian Village. Certainly there is
a world of difference between Qumbu and Blok's village of
Genuardo, most notably the fact that the mafia phenomenon in
Sicily is rooted in a semi-feudal land tenure system that is
entirely unknown in Transkei. But it is the very magnitude of the
underlying differences which make the similarities so striking.
** This Is not the place for an In-depth analysis of the
political economy of the South African homelands. Suffice it
to say that I believe that analysis should start with A.Q.
Obregon's almost forgotten article, "The marginal pole of the
economy and the marginalised labour force" In The Articulation
of Modes of Production, ed. H.WoIpe (London:RKP, 198O).
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and leads me to hope that the following characteristics of
unsocial banditry may be widely applicable.
• Unsocial banditry occurs In marginalised geographical areas or
social sectors in which there is no way out of poverty within the
parameters of community moral norms.
»• It flourishes where the state is so weak that it is unable to
routinely implement its own decisions, let alone present itself
as the voice of a national consensus, and where the principal
concern of a corrupt bureaucracy and its associated security
apparatus Is to ensure its own self-enrichment and self-
perpetuation.
»•« The thieves and the state apparatus share a common Interest
in preserving the status quo. They constitute a reactionary
rather than a progressive force. This Is true not only of 20th
Century Qumbu and 19th Century Sicily, but also of 18th Century
France, concerning which Richard Cobb has written:"
The habitually violent, like the habitually
criminal, do not normally constitute a threat to
the established order, of which they form a semi-
recognised part. Like the police, they have a
stake in society. We do not expect to find such
people in the ranks of the revolution ... Their
conservatism does not readily accept new
institutions, unfamiliar authorities, and judges
with unknown faces.
»»«» Far from sharing the value systems and aspirations of the
community from which they spring, unsocial bandits defy community
"Quoted in Blok, Mafia. p.lOOn.
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norms In favour of their own self-aggrandisement. This tendency
expresses itself in overtly aggressive behaviour designed to
inspire fear in the guise of respect and to flaunt the bandits'
apparent immunity from retribution.
•mum Unsocial bandits are, however, more vulnerable to attack by
radical democrats than are other elements of the corrupt social
order. Because their activities are illegal they cannot gain the
public support of the nominal defenders of law and order. They
therefore provide a convenient surrogate target for radical
movements which are too weak to undertake a head-on collision
with the conservative state Itself. The 1957 Makhuluspan which
targeted thieves rather than rehabilitation projects is almost a
classic example of this. Unsocial bandits are even more
vulnerable to a state which Is growing In strength and wishes to
appeal to popular sentiment without sacrificing its conservative
orientation. Mussolini's Sicily is a good example of this, as is
Lord Cromer's Egypt.••
»»«««« it is not, therefore, the thieves but the anti-thieves who
constitute the vanguard of a peasant society marginalised by the
dominance of industrial capitalism. The term "anti-thieves" is,
however, much too narrow to describe the alms and objectives of
the mobilised community known, in the Qumbu case, as the iband la
It is clearly not possible to unpack the I band I a concept in the
"Blok, Mafia, pp.182-9; N. Brown, "Brigands and State Bui I ding:
the Invention of Banditry in Modern Egypt", CSSH (199O).
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present paper, and to tease out all its connotations and
implications. But it is pertinent to note that because the
thieves are a marginal element within the dominant class,
any popular movement that concentrates exclusively on antl-
thlevlng will either collapse or, worse, degenerate into
vigilante or criminal organisation Itself. This almost happened
In Tsolo during the Makhuluspan period, and It might be happening
in'Qumbu at this very moment. But if the popular movement begins
with the thieves, who are the most obvious and vulnerable sector
of the reactionary forces, and then broadens Its alms to take on
the allies of the thieves, then antl-thleving might indeed become
a genuine vehicle of popular change and social renewal.
Denouement
In January 1993 Mark Dyasl, a shopkeeper who had taken
the lead In mobilising the anti-thieves on the north side of
Gqukunqa, was holding a meeting at the local primary school.*9
Two balaclava-clad men appeared out of nowhere and started
shooting. Everybody ran away but Oyasi, although unarmed, stood
his ground and attempted to talk to the thieves. They killed him
anyway, and carried on shooting bullets Into his body long after
he was dead. Shortly after the funeral, Dyasl's neighbour, who
•• Information related at Comrade Dyasi's funeral, Gqukunqa,
January 1993. Much of what follows derives from personal
conversations in Qumbu and Umtata.
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was regarded as the thieves' informant, was assassinated In
revenge. The professional nature of this assassination panicked
the thieves to such an extent that they themselves went into
hiding.
By this time, the Transkei government was deploying troops in the
district and taking some few ineffective steps to end the
violence. Joint army and police operations In Qumbu yielded more
than 300 stolen animals and more than 80 stolen motor vehicles.*0
An extremely able magistrate, Mr P.S. Nangu, was transferred to
Qumbu, and he transformed his office into neutral ground where
thieves and anti-thieves met on occasion to discuss their
differences. New police officers were assigned, and It Is
rumoured that certain notorious thieves were very badly beaten
up. Nomaraylsl still ruled in Gqukunqa, but his legal prospects
were not looking that good.
All of these factors were beginning to tilt the balance of forces
in Qumbu district against the power of the thieves. However, I
like to think that the turning point came at an ANC/SACP rally
held at Sulenkama to commemorate June 16th 1993. Nomaraylsi was
absent, but the rally was attended by Chief Sikhumbuzo Matlwane,
the senior chief of the area and long considered to be a fellow-
travel ler of the thieves. The keynote speaker was the venerable
Comrade Char I ton Ntuli.*'
•"Daily Dispatch. 4 Feb. 1993.
11
 Interview with Charlton Ntuli, Umtata, 26 August 1993.
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Up there [Ngqayl) we are not afraid of coming here.
People are remarking that they want to revenge
themselves, but we refuse because we think that it
would be a shame to be seen by our enemies fighting
our brothers, and we are not afraid of you. It can
only take us half a day to crush these people [the
thieves) because they are few. They may have many
guns, but these stones of ours are more than those
guns. That's what you should know.
And you must tell them [the thieves) that what they
are doing is a bad thing because you see the land is
not being harvested. Because cattle have been taken
and given to the people who are feeding the Mangopes
and the Buthelezis and the AWBs in the hostels. They
are feeding them with our cattle, which are your
brothers' cattle. And while they are giving away our
cattle, your brothers, your fathers, your sons are
dying of hunger.
Fifty percent have died through tuberculosis because
they eat nothing, and in the young ones it is thirty
percent living out of one hundred percent, and they
are weak because there is no milk to feed them. You
are selling their cattle. You are not even selling
them, you are giving them away. It Is a shame to
thieve.
Shortly thereafter, Nomarayisl communicated with the SACP, and
asked them to send a representative to Gqukunqa. One of the party
organisers went, and after a few points had been clarified,
Nomarayisl admitted that they, the thieves, had been wrong. He
expressed his wish to make peace, though he warned the comrades
that they had trained up some "hunting dogs", whom they would
find difficult to restrain. After that, several of the thieves
joined the ANC, and Gqukunqa has enjoyed a fragile peace ever
s 1 nee.
The Mzuzanto thieves, however, remained recalcitrant. Some time
in September 1933, they assassinated Comrade K. Mbombo of Mzuzanto,
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the Chairperson of the SACP In Qurrfou district. But the Vaal
Triangle connection, which had done so much to spawn the thieves,
now proved to be its own remedy. Comrades from Thokoza, steeled
in battle against Inkatha, returned to their rural homes and
commenced an all out offensive against the thieves. Makalanyana
Ratazo, the notorious thief who shot down Comrade Dumezweni at
the Qumbu bus rank in December 1992, was kidnapped from his home
and has never been seen again." The thieves fled from Mzuzanto
in December 1993, leaving their houses smouldering behind them.
And in January 1994, they arrived en masse at the Botha Sigcau
building in Umtata begging the Government for its help as their
victims had done before them.
It is still too early, much too early to predict an end to the
wave of violence which has wracked Qumbu for the past four years.
Not all the "hunting dogs" have been accounted for, and Third
Force elements might yet be lurking in the secret places of
Maclear. Above all, poverty and despair still continue to
destabilise the district of Qumbu. As long as they continue to
exist, it can only be a matter of time before the problem of
stock theft will once again raise its ugly head.
"Dally Dispatch 29 Jan. 1994.
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